racial steering by brokers who showed blacks houses in black or racially mixed neighborhoods and seldom showed whites houses in racially diverse communities or in places that had any visible minority population.[25] More recent audit studies of housing discrimination conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and by local housing and non-profit agencies -- where matched pairs of black and whites "testers" are sent to randomly selected real estate offices, consistently show the persistence of discriminatory treatment of black homeseekers and renters.[26] In short, discrimination by brokers has played a significant role in maintaining patterns of racial segregation throughout the United States, with an especially pronounced effect in metropolitan Detroit. Put differently, discriminatory real estate practices assure that blacks and Hispanics do not have the same degree of choice when they are house hunting as do whites.

Black and white attitudes also play a role in determining a neighborhood's racial composition. Detailed data from two University of Michigan-conducted Detroit Area Studies (1976 and 1992) show that blacks prefer racially mixed neighborhoods. Only a small number prefer to be "pioneers" in all-white neighborhoods; relatively few prefer all-black enclaves; but roughly nine out of ten blacks would be willing to move into neighborhoods inhabited by whites.[27] White views differ. Over the last two decades, whites have become more accepting, at least in principle, of the idea of having black neighbors.[28] But there remains a huge gap between principle and practice, between attitude (as measured by survey research) and behavior (as measured by actual patterns of racial mixing). Both Detroit area studies showed that "[w]hite demand for housing in an area is clearly affected by its racial composition." The more blacks a neighborhood has, the lower white demand for homes will be.[29] Also, in neighborhoods undergoing racial change, less prejudiced whites usually follow their more prejudiced predecessors in leaving neighborhoods as more blacks move in. There are virtually no neighborhoods in metropolitan Detroit that are one-third black, despite the fact that a majority of whites have told researchers that they would not feel uncomfortable living in such a neighborhood.

The lack of racial diversity in Detroit's neighborhoods can be explained in large part by the persistence of negative racial stereotypes. Metropolitan Detroit whites stated beliefs that blacks lack a work ethic, are prone to criminal activity, and are less intelligent than whites. A majority of Detroit area whites ranked whites more intelligent than blacks (56 percent); stated that blacks were more likely to "prefer to live off welfare" (71 percent); and spoke English less well than whites (77 percent).[30] The greater the extent to which whites endorsed these stereotypes, the less willing they were to accept blacks as neighbors. The authors of the Detroit study concluded that "whites who endorse negative stereotypes were more likely to say they would flee integrated neighborhoods and were less likely to consider moving into them." Similar studies conducted in other major metropolitan areas have also found that patterns of residential segregation by race are deeply rooted in racial stereotyping.[31]

It is important to note that residential segregation by race is not a natural consequence of disparities in income between blacks and whites. Middle-class and wealthy blacks are no more likely to live near whites than poor blacks. In an examination of the thirty metropolitan areas with the largest black populations in the United States, sociologists Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton found no significant difference in the segregation rates of poor, middle-class, and well-to-do African Americans. "Even if black incomes continued to rise," write Massey and Denton, "segregation would not have declined: no matter how much blacks earned, they remained racially separated from whites."[32] In metropolitan Detroit in 1990, the degree of residential segregation was uniformly high for blacks across the economic spectrum. The Index of Dissimilarity for black households with incomes below $5,000 was three points lower than that of black households with incomes of greater than $100,000. Rates of segregation among blacks and

whites of equal incomes, ranging between $5,000 and $75,000 were even higher.[33] In addition, large sections of Detroit's predominantly white suburbs have housing that most blacks can afford.[34]

Disparities in black and white economic status do not explain the high rates of residential racial segregation.

Black Suburbanization: A Sign of Change?

Since 1970, there has been a significant migration of African Americans away from center cities to suburbs. Suburban places like Prince Georges County, Maryland (outside Washington, DC) or Southfield, Michigan (outside Detroit) have generated much press coverage for their growing African American populations. Some observers have suggested that black suburbanization is a sign of significant change in American race relations, a move toward a more racially integrated society. But such optimistic views are not borne out by the evidence. Rather, patterns of residential segregation are persisting in suburbia. It is a fallacy to equate suburbanization with racial integration. In most places, black suburbanites have been greeted with white flight and the white abandonment of public schools.

Southfield, Michigan is a case in point. The community's black population has skyrocketed since 1970. One can find African Americans living in spacious 1950s and 1960s-era ranch houses, colonials, and tri-levels that were unavailable to them during the segregated era when they were built. Only 102 blacks lived in Southfield in 1970; nearly 7,000 lived there in 1980; about 29,000 lived there in 1990, making the black population about one-third of Southfield's total population.[35] But a review of census data for Southfield indicates a pattern of resegregation. The census tracts south of Ten Mile Road have become overwhelmingly African American. In addition, the Southfield public schools have witnessed a profound racial change. Eighty-seven percent of Southfield public school students were white in 1980; in 1990, 44 percent were white; in 1994-95, only 33 percent were white; in 1997 only 27 percent were white. It is likely, given the current trends, that Southfield will become a predominantly black community and that its schools will become almost completely black in the next ten years. If Detroit's past serves as an accurate guide, a growing black population will continue to spur white flight and lead to disinvestment and to Southfield's political marginalization in overwhelmingly white Oakland County.[36]

Conclusion: Consequences of Racial Segregation

The persistence of racial separation has had profound consequences for minorities and whites alike. It creates racially homogenous public institutions that are geographically defined, most importantly school districts. It limits the access of many minorities to employment opportunities, particularly in predominantly white areas (largely rural and suburban areas) that have experienced rapid development and economic growth over the last half century. It limits minorities' access to place based networks that provide access to jobs and economic opportunities, particularly for youth. It leads to a racial concentration of poverty in cities and to racial polarization in politics and in the distribution of resources. Because of strict segregation in cities and suburbs, blacks and whites do not perceive their interests to be common; better-off white suburbanites are increasingly unwilling to see their tax dollars spent on programs that they perceive will benefit cities and their minority residents. Fleeing whites then look back onto their old neighborhood and blame minorities for its deterioration, without acknowledging the role that stereotypes, population flight, and disinvestment played in the reshaping of those neighborhoods.[37] Racial separation has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whites do not live near minorities. Their residential distance fosters

misinformation and mistrust. It leads to a perpetuation of racial stereotypes that then become a basis and justification for racial segregation.

In sum, residential division by race remains a jarring anachronism in an increasingly racially diverse society. Residents of American cities like Detroit have created a cognitive map of the city based on racial classifications. Those classifications exact a high price. The high degree of segregation by race reinforces and hardens perceptions of racial difference. It has profound effects on racial attitudes and opportunities. And it creates a domino effect, seriously limiting interracial contact in many other arenas of American life.

IX. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

Racial homogeneity is the norm in American primary and secondary schools. American children are unlikely to encounter members of other racial groups in the classroom. Put differently, American primary and secondary schools are seldom diverse: most students go to schools with other students like themselves. By 1980, 17 of the nation's 20 largest cities had predominantly minority school districts. Most of them are surrounded by overwhelmingly white suburban school districts. As a consequence, University of Michigan demographer Reynolds Farley has shown, these public schools are "almost as racially segregated as those which were constitutionally permitted before the 1954 Brown decision."[38]

Table 8 calculates the number of Hispanic and black students who attend the school of the typical white student in six states with the largest number of freshman applicants to the University of Michigan. Between 1990 and 1995, applicants from these states made up 73 to 75 percent of the applicants to the University of Michigan from the United States.[39] The second column in the table, the percentage of blacks and Hispanics enrolled in all public schools, gives a sense of what the population of a school district would look like were all minorities evenly distributed across all school districts in the state. In these six states, white students attended schools that had far fewer minority students than the percentages enrolled in public schools statewide.

Table 8: Percent of Blacks and Hispanics Enrolled in All Public Schools and Enrolled in the Schools of Typical White Students in Selected States, 1991-92

	% Minority in School of Typical White		% Minority in Schools Statewide	
	Black	Hispanic	Black	Hispanic
Michigan	4.8	2.1	17.2	2.4
New York	6.7	5.0	20.1	15.8
Illinois	6.6	4.9	21.4	10.3
California	5.3	21.5	8.6	35.3
New Jersey	7.4	5.5	18.6	12.2
Ohio	7.0	1.0	14.1	1.3

Sources: Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation in American Schools: Changing Patterns of Separation and Poverty Since 1968 (Alexandria: National School Boards Association, 1993), Table 7; National Center for Educational Statistics, Digest of Educational Statistics (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 1993), Table 47. Figures for public school enrollment, 1991-1992.

In Michigan, most children attend schools with others like themselves. According to a study prepared for the National School Boards Association, Michigan ranks in the top four states in degree of black/white school segregation, along with New York, Illinois, and New Jersey. During the 1991-92 school year, 58.5 percent of black students in Michigan attended overwhelmingly minority schools (those with student populations that are 90 to 100 percent minority). Nearly four-fifths (79.9 percent) of black students in Michigan attended schools that have majority minority populations. It is striking that far more students are likely to attend racially integrated schools in the Southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia) than in Michigan.[40]

The three-county Detroit area offers a particularly striking example of the lack of diversity in primary and secondary education. A glance at school district enrollment figures for metropolitan Detroit makes clear the lack of diversity in most Detroit area schools (Figure 1). Of the 613,063 students attending public schools in Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne Counties, 66.4 percent are white; 29.9 percent are black; 1.7 percent are Hispanic; 0.6 percent are American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut; and 1.9 percent are Asian/Pacific Islander. These students attend school in 83 separate school districts. In 60 of the 83 Detroit area school districts, the black student population is three percent or less; another 7 districts have black student populations under ten percent. Altogether 90.7 percent of Detroit area white students attend schools in these districts. By contrast, districts with large numbers of blacks have very few whites. Eighty-two percent of Detroit-area blacks attend schools in only three nearly all-black school districts -- Detroit, Highland Park, and Inkster. The area's Hispanic population is more dispersed, but more than 50 percent of Detroit-area Hispanics attend schools in two predominantly black school districts, Detroit and Pontiac. Asians and American Indians are scattered throughout the area in very small numbers. While they are over represented in some districts (Asians in Bloomfield Hills, Troy, Novi, and West Bloomfield; American Indians in Gibraltar and Hazel Park), there are no sizeable concentrations of either group in the metropolitan area.[41]

Of Metropolitan Detroit's 83 school districts, only two (Mount Clemens and Romulus) come at all close to the three-county area proportion of blacks, Hispanics, and whites. If we compare the racial/ethnic composition of Detroit-area schools to the state as a whole, we find that only five small metropolitan Detroit school districts have black/white ratios approximating those of the state at large (Clintondale, Ferndale, Hamtramck, New Haven, and Van Buren). A total of 3,176 black students and 13,441 white students attend schools in these districts, or 1.8 percent of the three county area's black student population and 3.3 percent of the area's white student population.[42]

Source for Figure 1: K-12 Public Education in Michigan: Selected Characteristics and Services by County and School District (Lansing: Michigan League for Human Services, 1997). Calculated from school district enrollment data from 83 Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne County districts.

FIGURE 1

Racial Composition of School Districts Attended by Blacks and Whites in Detroit Area, 1994-95



The Roots of Racial Separation in Education

Racial divisions in metropolitan Detroit schools have a long historical pedigree. In the years before 1960, Detroit officials maintained patterns of segregation within the school district by redrawing the catchment areas of schools in racially changing areas and by allowing white students to transfer out of schools with growing black populations. Efforts to challenge the patterns of school segregation in Detroit met with intense white opposition, though a small number of white activists fought for racial integration and worked to achieve classroom diversity in the city. In 1960, when the school board, responding to critics of its racial division, introduced a voluntary "open schools" plan that allowed black children to transfer to formerly all-white schools, white parents' groups petitioned for the recall of elected school board members and boycotted classes for three days. Almost no whites participated in the program.[43]

Again in 1970, when the Detroit School Board announced a plan for the desegregation of its high schools, parents supported boycotts of classes and mounted a successful campaign to recall the four white school board members who supported the plan.[44] Whites also responded by withdrawing their children from Detroit's public schools in huge numbers. In the short period between 1967 and 1978, the Detroit Public School District lost 74 percent of its white students, the second highest rate of white enrollment decline in the public school districts of the nation's twenty largest cities.[45] By 1980, only 14 percent of Detroit public school students were white; in 1990, only 8.4 percent of Detroit public school students were white; in 1994-95, only 6.2 percent of Detroit public school students were white.[46]

The racial segregation of Detroit's schools was accompanied by the rapid growth of surrounding suburban school districts. As whites fled to the suburbs, they primarily settled in racially homogeneous communities. As a result, the racial composition of Detroit-area school districts reflects the homogeneity that prevails in most of the communities in the region. The high rate of residential segregation in housing ensures little racial diversity in education.

Also contributing to the racial division of Detroit area schools is the lack of significant programs in Michigan to bring together students across school district lines, as there are in other cities such as Indianapolis, where courts ordered inter-district desegregation, or Boston, Milwaukee, and Saint Louis, all of which have large voluntary inter-district school desegregation programs. Metropolitan Detroit has no voluntary or mandatory inter-district school integration programs. Most suburban residents opposed both inter-district busing and even small-scale voluntary efforts to bring minority students into their schools.[47]

Consequences of Divided Education

The consequences of racial disparities in education are far-reaching. Nearly every American child under the age of sixteen attends school; children spend most of their days over nearly three quarters of the year in the classroom; most children forge their most important non-familial relationships among their classmates. The vast majority of white primary and secondary school students have no significant contact with black, Hispanic, or American Indian students in the classroom. The vast majority of African American primary and secondary school students have no significant contact with white students on a daily basis. For more than a half century, specialists on race relations have reminded us that racial separation fosters mutual suspicion and hostility. It allows stereotypes and myths to flourish, because students lack direct evidence to contradict their erroneous impressions. The racial

and ethnic divisions in the United States are reinforced by the American educational system.

X. DIVERSITY AND DIFFERENCE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND OPPORTUNITY

There have been significant changes in the racial composition of the American workforce over the last fifty years. In 1963, when Ford Motor Company was asked to list its white-collar occupations that employed blacks, it included valets, porters, security guards, messengers, barbers, mail clerks, and telephone operators.[48] That such a list would be unimaginable today offers evidence of how much has changed. Only three decades ago, whole sectors of the economy were nearly all white. There were virtually no black, Hispanic, or Native American college professors. The number of black lawyers was minuscule and the vast majority of all-white law firms did not admit black lawyers. Black doctors could not get positions or even privileges in white hospitals. Nary a black face could be found among the tens of thousands of middle-level, white-collar workers in Detroit's private firms. The records of civil rights organizations like the Detroit Urban League contain many letters from highly qualified African Americans who were unable to get white collar jobs in white firms.[49]

Minorities made limited inroads in the blue-collar sector in the mid-twentieth century. Minorities made their biggest gains in the auto industry, particularly during World War II, when their representation in the auto plants of Detroit, Flint, and Saginaw rose significantly. But they were generally confined to certain sections of plants and certain job classifications and were virtually absent from many other factory complexes. With few exceptions, black and Hispanic workers were confined to what one observer aptly called "the meanest and dirtiest jobs" in the urban economy, whether it be janitorial, sanitation, maintenance work, or work in the unbearably hot and life-threatening forges at automobile and steel plants. And minorities were excluded from many other jobs altogether. Whole sectors of the labor market, ranging from the unionized, skilled trades to sales positions, were almost entirely closed to blacks. The unionized building trades remained heavily white. Few blacks could be found in metropolitan Detroit's brewing, chemical, and tool and die factories. Apprenticeship programs, the gateway to the lucrative skilled trades, were virtually closed to minorities. Until the 1960s, blacks and Hispanics had virtually no jobs that involved personal contact with white customers such as retail clerks, bank tellers, airline stewardesses, and cashiers.[50]

The walls of racial privilege fell slowly in Detroit area workplaces. A coalition of civil rights activists, elected officials from both parties, and unionists campaigned for workplace integration. Many of the state's most prominent employers opposed the 1955 Fair Employment Practices law that forbade discrimination on the basis of race or creed in Michigan. In the early 1960s, civil rights pickets in front of some of the state's most venerable businesses (the National Bank of Detroit and General Motors) led these companies to take steps to bring aboard black employees to avoid public embarrassment. Other civil rights activists targeted the mostly white skilled trades and apprenticeship program and targeted department stores, breweries, and groceries, all of which had formerly excluded minorities.[51]

In the aftermath of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, many firms began to open their doors gradually to minority employees. Government contractors, bound by anti-discrimination and equal opportunity laws, made inroads in the hiring of minorities. But the experience of minorities in private sector employment has been mixed. Some employers continued to prefer the comfort of homogeneity and avoid what they perceive to be the risks of diversification. Data from the Multi-City study of Urban Inequality shows that in Detroit, Boston, Atlanta, and Los Angeles, many employers regularly make hiring decisions based on stereotypes

about minorities and use race or ethnicity as "signals" of desirable or undesirable work characteristics. Many employers fear that minority workers will be less reliable, prone to crime, and unwilling to work hard.[52] Detailed interviews with Chicago area employers have also found that employers use race as a proxy for worker skills, motivation, and personal characteristics.[53] Pernicious racial stereotypes persist in many workplaces, a consequence of the fact that most white employers know precious little about minority workers and have little experience with them in other aspects of their daily lives.

Change also occurred haltingly for middle-class minorities. Prior to the civil rights era, there was a small black middle-class, mostly owners of what were called "race" businesses, such as funeral homes, restaurants and clubs, barber shops, and small stores that served a largely black clientele. Black businesspeople, with few exceptions, operated in a segregated world. For example, before 1961, there were no black "realtors." Black real estate brokers were called "realtists," because they were denied membership in the Detroit Real Estate Board and forbidden to use the trademark name "realtor." Even in the case of government, where blacks made the largest inroads, most were clustered in a few departments that served a primarily black constituency.[54]

A transformation in the composition of the black middle class occurred largely in two periods, between 1950 and 1960 and most dramatically after 1970 (Table 9). In 1960, the entire state of Michigan had only 324 black physicians, 142 black lawyers, 201 black engineers, and 95 black college teachers. The number of black physicians actually fell during the 1960s and the number of black lawyers increased by only 51 in that decade. But between 1970 and 1990, the number of black professionals rose significantly. By 1990, Michigan had 1,076 black doctors, 1,178 black lawyers, 2,658 black engineers, and 1,509 black college teachers. By any measure, the gains over a short twenty year period were remarkable. The number of black professionals rose most steadily in the aftermath of the civil rights era, as the first sizeable generation of black students graduated from law schools, medical schools, and other institutions of higher education (Table 9).

Table 9: Number of Blacks and Percent of the Total Workforce Employed in Selected Michigan Professions, 1940-1990.

	1940		1950		1960	
	Num.	Pct.	Num.	Pct.	Num.	Pct.
Physicians	125	2.0	196	2.7	324	3.4
Attorneys	63	1.2	95	1.7	142	2.2
Clergy	194	4.4	381	0.7	345	4.9
Engineers	25	0.2	78	0.3	201	0.5
Editors, Reporters & Authors	17	0.8	24	0.7	28	0.6
College Teachers	6	0.2	15	0.3	95	1.1
Elementary & Secondary Teachers	183	0.5	845	1.9	2687	3.9
Social Workers	92	3.3	363	8.9	760	13.3
Nurses	109	0.8	509	2.8	1322	5.3

	1970		1980		1990	
	Num.	Pct.	Num.	Pct.	Num.	Pct.
Physicians	303	2.6	846	5.0	1076	5.0
Attorneys	193	2.3	685	4.2	1178	5.7
Clergy	404	5.0	549	5.5	676	6.2
Engineers	722	1.3	2156	3.4	2658	4.4
Editors, Reporters & Authors	161	3.2	242	4.0	621	6.6
College Teachers	440	2.2	1059	4.5	1059	5.6
Elementary & Secondary Teachers	7499	7.1	11528	9.2	13143	10.3
Social Workers	1652	19.0	4743	22.8	6989	25.9
Nurses	2535	7.9	3404	7.3	5612	8.1

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1940 Census of Population: Michigan, Vol. 1, Part 24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), Table 13; 1950 Census of Population: Michigan, Vol. 1, Part 24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), Table 77; 1960 Census of Population: Michigan, Vol. 1, Part 24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), Table 122; 1970 Census of Population: Michigan, Vol. 1, Part 24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), Table 171; 1980 Census of Population: Michigan, Vol. 1, Part 24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), Table 219; 1990 Census of Population and Housing: Equal Employment Opportunity File, on CD-ROM (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992). Data from 1990 includes the entire Experienced Civilian Labor Force.

The increase in the number of black professionals after 1970 had roots in two major changes. The first was the dramatic expansion of opportunities in higher education for African Americans. The percentage of blacks with more than a high school education rose gradually in the postwar era, primarily because blacks migrated to the north, where they had greater educational opportunities than in the Jim Crow south (Table 10). Still, significant black-white gaps persisted. Indeed, the ratio of blacks and whites in higher education worsened slightly in the 1960s but improved dramatically after 1970. The biggest increases came after 1970 when blacks entered universities and professional and graduate schools in large numbers for the first time.

Table 10: College Attendance and Completion by Race in Michigan, Persons 25 Years and Older, 1960-1990

Percent with 4 or More Years of College

	Black	White	Black/White Ratio
1960	2.9	7.2	40
1970	3.8	10.0	38
1980	7.6	14.9	51
1990	10.1	18.1	56
Total with College Degrees or Who Attended College			
1960	8.4	15.5	54
1970	10.5	20.0	53
1980	24.1	30.6	79
1990	38.3	45.3	85

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census of Population: Michigan, Vol. 1, Part 24, Table 103; 1970 Census of Population: Michigan, Vol. 1, Part 24, Table 148; 1980 Census of Population: Michigan, Vol. 1, Part 24, Table 203; 1990 Census of Population: Michigan, CP-1-24 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).

The second major change occurred in private and public sector hiring practices, particularly for white-collar positions. Government became one of the most important avenues for minority opportunity. And in the 1970s, many employers began to reach out to minority workers out of fear of litigation. Some of the largest minority white-collar gains came in personnel offices that deal with state and federal agencies that enforced anti-discrimination laws. Many employers also began to create more diverse workforces when they realized that multicultural workplaces offered many competitive advantages. In some firms, minorities have made gains in positions that required contact with minority customers or clients in Africa, Latin America, or the Caribbean. Others have hired minority executives in sales and marketing to reach lucrative ethnic niches in the market. And growing number of employers contend that a diverse workforce brings significant competitive advantages. In 1984, the Xerox company, to take one example, launched a plan to create a "balanced workforce." Only a decade earlier, Xerox was one of the most homogeneously white firms in the country, with few minority employees.[55] In a 1996 Harvard Business Review article that surveyed employers about racial and ethnic diversity, David Thomas and Robin Ely noted that a growing number of managers

argue that "[a] more diverse workforce will . . . increase organizational effectiveness. It will lift morale, bring greater access to new segments of the marketplace and enhance productivity . . . ."[56] In addition, predictions about demographic change over the next half century have provided a compelling rationale that workplace diversity is crucial to firms' growth and survival.[57]

In sum, the experience of minorities in the workforce is mixed. Many employers still discriminate, the consequence of the persistence of stereotypes about minority groups. Other employers, particularly in the white collar sector, are demanding more diverse workforces and rewarding employees who have experience with diversity and are comfortable in diverse settings.

XI. QUALITY OF LIFE: WEALTH AND HEALTH DIFFERENCES

In large part because of pervasive racial separation in residence, education, and opportunity, minorities and white Americans experience significantly different qualities of life. As a result, individuals from different racial and ethnic backgrounds have different expectations and perspectives on some of the most fundamental aspects of day-to-day life. There are stark racial and ethnic gaps in income, wealth, poverty, and health.

African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans are far more likely than whites to be economically insecure. Hispanics, blacks, and American Indians are unemployed at twice the rate of whites.[58] The median household income of blacks is 62.6 percent of that of whites, Hispanics 63.9 percent of whites, and American Indians 55.6 percent of whites.[59] Minorities are also disproportionately poor. In the nation as a whole, each group has high rates of poverty (Table 11). The experience of poverty is not unfamiliar to minority children (Table 12). A large percentage of black and Hispanic children grew up poor; many more are likely to have near relatives who live in poverty. Michigan's minorities are also more likely to be living in poverty or at low economic status than their white counterparts.

Table 11: Percent of Families below Poverty Level by Race and Ethnicity, United States, 1960-1995

	All	White	Black	Hispanic	Amer. Inc.	Asian
1960	18.1	14.9	NA	NA	NA	NA
1970	10.1	8.0	29.5	NA	NA	NA
1980	10.3	8.0	28.9	23.2	NA	NA
1990	10.7	8.1	29.3	25.0	27.2	11.9
1995	10.8	8.5	26.4	27.0		12.4

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, Tables 50, 52, 744. NA means data not available.

Table 12: Children in Poverty, United States, 1970-1995 by Race and Hispanic Origin

	All	White	Black	Hispanic
1970	14.9	10.5	41.5	NA
1980	17.9	13.4	42.1	33.0
1990	19.9	15.1	44.2	37.7
1995	20.0	15.5	41.5	39.3

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, Table 737.

The reasons for high rates of impoverishment among African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans are many-fold. Blacks are most likely to live in areas that have been left behind by the profound restructuring of the national and international economy: major metropolitan areas, particularly in the northeast and midwest or underdeveloped and very poor areas in the "black belt" region of the deep South. In addition, many black families are headed by women, whose income alone is often insufficient to raise families above the poverty line.[60] Residential segregation has also led to a concentration of poverty in urban areas, such as Detroit. The experience of Hispanics is more varied. Hispanics of African descent or black Hispanics are the worst off, in part as a consequence of their long subordinate status in most Latin American countries; in part because they face similar discrimination by color that affects African Americans. Many Hispanic migrants and immigrants, particularly those from Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic have been employed in the poorest paying, lowest status jobs in the United States, such as farm labor, household service, groundskeeping, and janitorial work. Educational deprivation and lack of language skills also limits many Hispanics' opportunities in the labor market.[61] American Indians, particularly residents of reservations, face staggeringly high rates of impoverishment, in large part because they were relegated to marginal lands, with few natural resources, that had little value for white American settlers. Among American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts who lived on reservations, native lands, or trust lands, poverty rates in 1990 exceeded 50 percent.[62]

The experience of poverty among large segments of the minority population is noteworthy in its own right, but it also has far-reaching consequences for many middle-class and well-to-do minorities. The most detailed research on the cross-class effects of poverty concerns middle-class blacks. The black middle class has not, by and large, been able to escape poverty to the degree that middle-class whites have. To be sure, many well-to-do blacks have attempted to move to neighborhoods or communities away from poor and working-class people. But there is little evidence that they have been able to move far from poor people or that the degree of rich-poor separation among blacks has grown. As a consequence many middle-class blacks have direct experience with poverty and its consequences.[63] Middle-class black neighborhoods in cities are often "nestled between areas that are less economically stable," meaning that poverty and its consequences are seldom distant realities in their communities.[64] In addition, middle-class blacks are very likely to live in neighborhoods with large numbers of blue-collar workers, a trend much less likely among whites.[65] The proximity to poverty has many other consequences for middle-class African Americans. Blacks of all classes are more likely to be victims of crime. As Alba, Logan, and Bellair have shown, "[e]ven the most affluent blacks are not able to escape from crime, for they reside in communities as crime-prone as those housing the poorest whites."[66]

The life experience of minorities is fundamentally different from that of whites in another crucial area: wealth. The median household net worth of blacks as of 1993 was only 9.7 percent of that of whites. Hispanics' median household net worth was only 10.2 percent of whites. The wealth gap persists at all levels of household income. The highest quintile of black households by income had only 36.5 percent the median net worth of the highest quintile of white households by income. Upper middle-class blacks and Hispanics -- those in the second highest income quintile -- had a median household net worth less than that of lower middle-class whites -- those in the second lowest income quintile.[67] Large gaps persist between blacks and whites at all levels of income, age, and education. The median net worth of blacks with college degrees is only 23 percent of the median net worth of whites with college degrees.[68] Part of the explanation for wealth differentials are that whites are more likely to own homes than either blacks or Hispanics. And the value of homes owned by blacks is significantly lower than that of whites.[69]

The difference in wealth shapes the opportunities and outlooks of blacks, Hispanics, and whites in different ways. Whereas many whites can expect financial support at crucial junctures in their lives (going to college, getting married, buying a home) and inheritances as the result of their parents' accumulated wealth, few blacks and Hispanics can expect such good fortune. Because of the white-minority wealth gap, most black and Hispanic parents cannot offer substantial subsidies and bequests to their children. Wealth differentials are not just important in terms of life chances: they also shape attitudes. Whites are far more likely to express optimism about their future economic prospects than are members of racial and ethnic minority groups. This is in part the consequence of different expectations about the job market. But differential wealth shapes different expectations about family support and future wealth accumulation.[70]

One of the most important indicators of quality of life is health. One's long-term expectations are shaped in fundamental ways by one's experience with illness, injury, and death from the care of a sick child or adult, to the economic impact of disease and disability, to the devastation of seeing a family member die, particularly in an untimely fashion. The racial and ethnic gaps in health and life expectancy are stark. The life expectancy of whites in 1995 was 76.1; for blacks, it was 69.8. The life expectancy gap between black men and white men was particularly large: white men can expect to live 73.4 years; black men can expect to live only 65.4 years.[71]

Racial gaps in health are significant throughout the life course. Blacks and Hispanics are nearly twice as likely as whites to incur a fetal loss (a stillbirth or miscarriage) during pregnancy. Blacks are nearly four times as likely as whites to have an induced abortion; Hispanics are twice as likely as non-Hispanic whites to have an induced abortion.[72] In 1994, infant mortality rates were nearly two-and-one half times as high for blacks as for whites, and fifty percent higher for American Indians. Blacks have significantly higher death rates than whites for most of the top fifteen leading causes of death in the United States (Table 13).[73]

Throughout the life course, blacks are more likely than whites to die of homicide, residential fires, drowning, and pedestrian accidents. The gap in homicide rates is enormous. Black men have a rate of death by homicide nearly nine times greater than that of white men; the homicide rate for black women is nearly six times greater than that of white women. The gap between black and white homicide death rates is greatest among young men. Homicide is the leading cause of death for black men aged 15-44. The grim reality of violence affects large segments of black America, not merely the poor. A remarkable 70 percent of blacks surveyed stated that they knew someone who had been shot in the last five years, more than double the rate of whites.[74]

Table 13: Black/White Ratio of Age-Adjusted Death Rates for the 15 Leading Causes of Death in the United States

Heart Disease	1.48
Cancer	1.37
Cerebrovascular Diseases	1.86
Pulmonary Diseases	.81
Accidents	1.03
Pneumonia/Influenza	1.44
Diabetes mellitus	2.41
HIV	3.69
Suicide	.58
Homicide	5.97
Liver diseases	1.48
Kidney diseases	2.76
Septicemia	2.71
Atherosclerosis	1.08
Perinatal conditions	3.32

Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1992, Vol. 2, Mortality, Part A (Washington: Public Health Service, 1996), Tables 1-6, 1-8, 1-40.

XII. DIVISIONS IN ATTITUDES AND PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion researchers have long examined differences and similarities between blacks and whites. There is relatively little comparative polling data on Hispanics -- in part because of language barriers, in part because their numbers have grown substantially only in recent years. It is virtually impossible to find detailed surveys of Native Americans because of their small numbers. Surveys range widely and relatively few surveys permit systematic comparisons over time. In addition, surveys vary in the questions that they ask and in the ways that they frame issues. While there is no such thing as a fixed, inflexible "white" opinion or "black" opinion, given the variety of surveys and the range of questions asked, surveys show that large gaps divide whites and blacks on a wide range of issues and that those gaps have persisted over time.

Let us begin with common ground. There is much agreement across racial lines on general principles: democracy, striving for success, optimism about the future, an emphasis on individual initiative, and an acceptance of capitalism.[75] A majority of Americans of all races repudiate formalized, de jure racial discrimination.[76] But while common belief on general principles is noteworthy, there are wide gaps on an understanding of how those principles are translated into practice. Blacks and whites differ significantly on their analysis of what is fair, of the extent of inequality and discrimination in American life, and of the desirability of public policies across a wide spectrum.

Large and persistent gaps separate black and white views of race, discrimination, and equality. Whites see little discrimination in American life and they believe that what little they see is diminishing. Minorities, on the other hand, believe that discrimination by race persists and is hardening.[77] Large numbers of minority respondents to surveys report that they or people that they know have been affected personally by racial discrimination and claim that their race affected their hiring prospects or promotion or treatment in the workplace. A steadily rising number of whites believe that race relations have improved in the United States.[78] In 1988, 87 percent of whites believed that "in the past twenty five years, the country has moved closer to equal opportunity among the races," whereas the number of blacks who believed the same declined between the 1960s and the 1980s from between 50 and 80 percent to 20 to 45 percent.[79] In recent surveys (conducted between 1988 and 1991), whites were more likely to believe that "compared with whites," blacks had "equal or greater educational opportunity" (26-27 point difference), "equal or greater job opportunity" (27-36 point difference) and "equal or greater opportunity for promotion to supervisory or managerial jobs" (17-29 point difference).[80] As political scientist Jennifer Hochschild concludes, both blacks and whites agree on the notion of the American dream, but not on whether it has been realized. "Whites believe it works for everyone; blacks believe it works only for those not of their race. Whites are angry that blacks refuse to see the fairness and openness of the system; blacks are angry that whites refuse to see the biases and blockage of the system."[81]

Some of the best data available for the examination of questions of race and public opinion come from the National Election Studies, conducted since 1952 for every midterm and presidential election. The National Election Studies (NES) are the benchmark for quality survey research and serve as the model for many other public opinion surveys. Since 1986, the NES has paid special attention to public opinion on race and public policy. Like other surveys, the NES reveals significant racial divisions on matters of race and public policy. According to the 1986 National Election Study, more than 80 percent of blacks agreed that "one of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance." Only 45 percent of whites with incomes over $15,000 agreed; 57 percent of whites with incomes less than $15,000 agreed.[82] The NES also offers evidence of wide disparities in black and white views of what constitutes proper government action. Data from the 1986, 1988, and 1992 NES showed that blacks offer high levels of support compared to whites for government social programs and government intervention in matters such as education, the economy, poverty, and housing. By large margins over whites, blacks favored programs to address discrimination in schools and the workplace.[83] Revealingly, the black-white gap grew even greater when black surveyors interviewed blacks and white interviewers interviewed whites, although the regardless of questioner, the racial gap persisted.[84]

On foreign policy issues, blacks and whites were more alike, but some noteworthy differences remained. In nearly equal numbers in the 1986-1992 NES surveys, nearly equal percentages of blacks and whites agreed about U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union (they both supported it) and U.S. involvement in Central America (about half of each group thought that the U.S. should withdraw). And similar percentages of blacks and whites (about one third of each) supported a cut in military spending. But agreement was not uniform across all foreign policy issues. Large gaps separated blacks and whites on U.S. policy toward South Africa (twice as many blacks favored sanctions against the apartheid regime as whites). And in 1992, blacks were more likely by nearly thirty points than whites to oppose U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf. On social policies, including abortion, school prayer, and immigration restrictions black-white opinion was also relatively close. [85]

Studies of Hispanic and Asian American opinion are unfortunately fragmentary. There is nothing comparable in scale or scope to the National Election Studies that allow for a comparison of

Hispanic and white and black public opinion. Most surveys are from states with large Hispanic populations such as Texas and California. While they lack the comprehensiveness and detail of black/white opinion surveys, some trends emerge from the data. Like blacks and whites, Hispanics subscribe to some of the basic beliefs in hard work, individual achievement, and the "American dream."[86] Persons of Hispanic descent tend to favor government spending and anti-discrimination efforts to a greater extent than whites but to a lesser degree than blacks. On social issues, Hispanics are often more conservative than whites or blacks. Hispanic voters, for example, tend to favor restrictions on abortion to a greater degree than either groups. And like whites, many Hispanics hold negative stereotypes of blacks.[87]

Blacks and whites diverge on many other issues, trivial and significant. One of the most notable variations involves matters of law and order and criminal justice. Blacks have long been more suspicious of the police than whites, in part a consequence of the long history of disproportionate white representation on police forces, in part a consequence of deep-rooted memories of racial injustices such as lynching and the infamous trials of the Scottsboro Boys in the 1930s and the hasty acquittals of the murderers of Emmett Till and Medgar Evars in the 1950s and 1960s. National survey data covering the period from 1973 to 1993 show that blacks are less likely than whites to approve of police use of force against suspects. The recent furor over the trial of O.J. Simpson offers evidence of the black-white gap on legal matters. In the aftermath of the Simpson trial, the Washington Post found that 85 percent of blacks and only 34 percent of whites agreed with the jury's decision.[88]

Michigan-focused research confirms many of the national trends. From the 1940s onward, a slew of survey researchers have subjected Michigan's residents to close scrutiny. One of the pioneers in survey research, Arthur Kornhauser, conducted a survey of Detroit residents in 1951 and found that only 18 percent of white respondents from all over the city expressed "favorable" views toward the "full acceptance of Negroes" and 54 percent expressed "unfavorable" attitudes toward integration.[89]

In the decades since Kornhauser's survey of Detroit residents, white attitudes towards blacks have changed significantly, at least in terms of what they tell pollsters and survey researchers. Already by the 1960s, diminishing numbers of Detroiters told researchers that they approved of Jim Crow type segregation in their city. The boundaries of what is considered acceptable expression on matters of race have changed greatly for the better in the last forty years. But if white attitudes towards minorities have changed, but there remain very deep divisions and stereotypes that have persisted despite the civil rights revolution.

In the late 1980s, political scientist and pollster Stanley Greenberg conducted polls and focus groups among suburban white Detroiters. Directing his attention to "Reagan Democrats," that is working and middle class whites who defected from the Democratic party, Greenberg found intense racial resentments. He found that in his focus groups of white voters: "Blacks constituted the explanation for their vulnerability and for almost everything that had gone wrong in their lives; not being black was what constituted being middle class; not living with blacks was what made a neighborhood a decent place to live." Blacks, in the view of the whites interviewed, were privileged members of society; whites were disadvantaged victims.[90]

Many minorities have likewise expressed deep suspicion toward whites. Surveys of Detroiters conducted in the late 1969, showed that fifty percent of blacks but only 20 percent of whites were dissatisfied with the city's police.[91] Many black elected officials in Detroit built campaigns around their constituents' suspicion of the police. In 1992, less than twenty percent of Detroit area blacks, compared to about sixty percent of Detroit area whites expressed satisfaction with their police protection. White suburbanites were most satisfied with police protection (59 percent) compared to

black city residents (10-15 percent) and black suburbanites (25-45 percent).[92]

Whatever the validity of the beliefs expressed in polls and surveys, it is clear that blacks and whites have sharply divergent views about crucial issues such as the role of government, the reality of equal opportunity in crucial arenas of American life, and the effectiveness of certain social policies. This divergence is the consequence of centuries of racial division and separation in American life. The racial gap in opinion persists, even as some indicators, such as gaps in black-white family income levels and black-white high school graduation rates, are showing convergence.

XIII. CONCLUSION

In an increasingly diverse country, deep divisions persist between whites, blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians. There is nothing natural about these divisions. They are not immutable facts of life. Rather they are a consequence of a troubled and still unresolved past. Much about race and ethnic relations has changed in the last half century, but it is undeniable that in many aspects of American life, separation and interracial suspicion persist. Racial and ethnic groups remain separated by residence and education. Pronounced differences by race and ethnicity persist in socio-economic status and public opinion. Racial and ethnic stereotypes are all too common. There are unfortunately few places in American society where people of different backgrounds interact, learn from each other, and struggle to understand their differences and discover their commonality. The fundamental issue that we face at the end of the twentieth century is to work to overcome our divisions in the spirit of the venerable American motto, "E Pluribus Unum." To build unity from pluralism, to recognize diversity and learn from it, to fashion a democracy of many voices, is still an unfinished project. Its success is vital to our nation's future.

XIV. NOTES TO TEXT

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8. Vargas, Proletarians of the North, pp. 66-69, 131-133.

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13. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). For a discussion of the Detroit background to the Shelley case, see Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, pp. 181-183. On patterns of segregation nationwide, see the overviews in Douglas S. Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Urban Underclass (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); and Arnold R. Hirsch, "With or Without Jim Crow: Black Residential Segregation in the United States," in Urban Policy in Twentieth-Century America, ed., Arnold R. Hirsch and Raymond A. Mohl (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993), pp. 65-99.

14. Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, pp. 11, 111-112; Reynolds Farley and William H. Frey, "Changes in the Segregation of Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society," American Sociological Review 59 (1994), p. 35.

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28. In 1976, 84 percent of whites expressed that they would be unwilling to move into a neighborhood that was 60 percent or more black; in 1992, the number of whites unwilling to move to such a neighborhood fell to 71 percent. In 1976, 50 percent of Detroit area whites expressed their unwillingness to move into a majority white neighborhood that was two-thirds white and only one-third black; only 31 percent were unwilling to move into such a neighborhood in 1992. Farley, et al, "Stereotypes and Segregation," p. 756, Figure 3.

29. Farley, et al., "Stereotypes and Segregation," p. 757.

30. Farley, et al., "Stereotypes and Segregation," p. 778, Table A1.

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32. Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, pp. 84-87, Table 4.1.

33. Farley, et al., "Stereotypes and Segregation," pp. 751-752.

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EXPERT REPORT OF ERIC FONER

Gratz, et al. v. Bollinger, et al., No. 97-75321 (E.D. Mich.)
Grutter, et al. v. Bollinger, et al., No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich.)

I. Statement of Qualifications:

I am currently the DeWitt Clinton Professor of History at Columbia University. I have been a faculty member in the Columbia Department of History since 1982. Before that, I served as a Professor in the Department of History of City College and Graduate Center at City University of New York from 1973-1982. I have written extensively on issues of race in American history, with particular emphasis on the Reconstruction period. I will become the President-elect of the American Historical Association in January 1999. A complete *curriculum vitae*, including a list of publications, is attached hereto as Appendix A.

II. Information Considered in Forming Opinions:

A selected bibliography of sources consulted is attached hereto as Appendix B.

III. Other expert testimony; compensation:

I have not testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. I am being compensated at a rate of $200/hr. for my work in connection with this matter.

IV. Opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor:

Executive Summary

Race has been a crucial line of division in American society since the settlement of the American colonies in the beginning of the 17th century. It remains so today. While the American understanding of the concept of "race" has changed over time, the history of African-Americans provides a useful template for understanding the history of race relations. The black experience has affected how other racial minorities have been treated in our history, and illuminates the ways in which America's white majority has viewed racial difference.

Of the approximately 800,000 people to arrive in the American colonies between 1607 and the Revolution, approximately 300,000 were African slaves. Slavery was not a static institution. In the early colonial period, the experience of African slaves had much in common with that of white indentured servants. The rise of plantation agriculture in the South ushered in a far harsher era of slavery, and the concept of race took on a greater social significance. This entrenched form of slavery -- ultimately enshrined in the Constitution -- helped shape the identity of all Americans.

In the 19th century, the abolitionist movement argued for a purely civic understanding of American identity, insisting that genuine freedom meant civic equality. In the era of Reconstruction, American society formally embraced these

principles. But this experiment in interracial democracy lasted only a little more than a decade. By the early 20th century, a new system of racial subordination had been established in the South, effectively nullifying the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, while in the North blacks were denied access to industrial employment.

In the 20th century, while both World War I and the New Deal presented opportunities to challenge the racial status quo, both experiences served only to sharpen the line of racial demarcation. During World War II, in response to Nazi tyranny, American society again embraced the language of racial equality. A period of civil rights activism followed, as black Americans once again turned to federal law and invoked the federal Constitution as source of protection against subordination. While these decades have seen substantial progress in addressing racial inequality, the salience of race in American life remains powerful. In part because of historic memory, and in part because of current reality, race continues to affect outlook, perception, and experience.

* * * * *

Since the earliest days of colonial settlement, race has been a crucial line of division in American society. For two and a half centuries, the large majority of African-Americans were held in slavery, and even after emancipation were subjected to discrimination in every aspect of their lives. Other minority groups have suffered severe inequalities as well. Today, while the nation has made great progress in eradicating the "color line," the legacy of slavery and segregation remains alive in numerous aspects of American society.

It would be wrong, of course, to generalize too broadly about the lives of any group of Americans. As with whites, the experiences of black Americans have been shaped by region and class as well as race. Nonetheless, because of their unique historical relationship to the key institutions of American life – including the polity, economy, and judicial and educational systems – blacks by and large have had different life experiences and have developed different social attitudes and expectations than most white Americans. This results not from any inborn "racial" characteristics, but from the historical development of American society.

Scholars today frequently describe race as "socially constructed." By this they mean that rather than a timeless biological reality, race, defined as a society's racial ideas and practices, has changed dramatically over time. This report will chronicle how the meaning of "race" and the status and experience of racial minorities have evolved during the course of American history. The history of race in America is not a narrative of linear progress toward a preordained goal. Rather, it is a story of continual debates and struggles, in which rights are sometimes won and at other times taken away.

Different societies define race in different ways. In the United States, the idea of race has at various times encompassed groups (like Irish, Jewish, and Italian immigrants) who are no longer considered separate "races," but have been assimilated into the broad category of white Americans. Today, with the Hispanic and Asian-American populations growing rapidly, the familiar bipolar understanding of race in America as a matter of black and white is increasingly out of date. Nonetheless, this report of the salience of race in American history will focus primarily, although not exclusively, on the experience of African-Americans. There are compelling historical reasons for this. Not only have African-Americans suffered an exceptional degree of discrimination, beginning with two and a half centuries of racial slavery, but for historical reasons, the black condition has been and remains a unique litmus test of how fully American society lives up to its professed creed of equal rights and opportunities for all citizens. Moreover, the black experience has profoundly affected how other racial minorities have been treated in our history, and the ways in which such groups have viewed the larger society. (Thus, in the 1960s, the movement for black civil rights quickly